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The deadly Grenfell Tower fire was caused by ‘decades of failure’ by local and central government, according to the Inquiry’s Phase 2 report.
Evidence uncovered during the Inquiry showed that Government departments, including the Home Office, and the Department for Communities and Local Government, allowed their thinking to be dominated by a deregulatory agenda “to such an extent that even matters affecting safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded.”
Chaired by a panel comprised of the Right Honourable Sir Martin Moore-Bick, Ali Akbor OBE and Thouria Istephan, the Inquiry’s report laid out the causes of the fire and those it considered responsible in scathing terms.
The system of regulating construction and refurbishment were found to be “seriously defective”, with statutory guidance meant to clarify the law “poorly worded and liable to mislead”. Despite these shortcomings, Government failed to actively monitor the system’s performance and failed to communicate the dangers of combustible insulation to industry.
Notable large-scale fire tests of aluminium composite panels showed materials that “burned violently”, yet these were still used to refurbish Grenfell Tower and many other high-rise buildings like it. Because the results were not published and industry was not warned about the risk, the panels were described only in “vague and ill-considered words” and thus not fully understood.
Industry itself did not escape blame from the report. Specific companies involved in the refurbishment were accused of “deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market.”
Industry giants Arconic Architectural Products, Celotex, and Kingspan were each named, as evidence demonstrated they ignored or underplayed concerns about the unsuitability of their products for use in higher-risk buildings. All three companies have issued lengthy denials of wrongdoing in the days following the Inquiry’s report.
The report also condemned the work of the Building Research Establishment, an industry body that was “marred by unprofessional conduct, inadequate practices, a lack of effective oversight, poor reporting and a lack of scientific rigour.”
Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer apologised on behalf of Government, saying:
“I want to start with an apology on behalf of the British state to each and every one of you, and indeed to all the families affected by this tragedy. It should never have happened.
He went on to address the report’s recommendations for improving building safety:
“We are now addressing the recommendation from Sir Martin’s first report, to introduce a new Residential Personal Emergency Evacuation Plan policy for anyone whose ability to evacuate could be compromised, and funding this for those renting in social housing.
“We will look at all 58 of Sir Martin’s recommendations in detail. There will be a debate on the floor of this House. We will respond in full to the Inquiry’s recommendations within six months.”
Among the report’s many recommendations, the Inquiry called for “complex and fragmented” responsibility for building safety to be consolidated into a single, independent Building Regulator. This body, reporting to a single secretary of state, would regulate all construction products and practices, enabling a more efficient exchange of information.
This proposed regulator would also establish a system of mandatory accreditation to certify the competence of fire risk assessors, by setting clear standards for qualification.
At present, a ‘fire engineer’ doesn’t denote any formal qualification; and as a result, it’s possible for anyone to practise under this title.
Grenfell Tower’s Tenant Management Organisation had one fire risk assessor for its entire estate, who was “ill-qualified to carry out fire risk assessments on buildings of the size and complexity of Grenfell Tower”.
Other key recommendations include urgent review of Approved Document B, the official guidance for the Building Regulations. This had been found “defective”, and following it in future should “amount to compliance” with the Regulations.
Higher risk buildings should have a fire strategy reviewed by a qualified fire engineer, including any “stay put” strategies currently in place.
Ali Akbor, sitting on the panel of the Inquiry, commented on the report’s findings and recommendations:
“What is needed is for those with responsibility for building safety to reflect and to treat Grenfell as a touchstone in all that they do in the future.”
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